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BORDER EXCEPTIONALISM IN THE ERA OF
MOVING BORDERS
Jennifer M Chac6n*
ABSTRACT
Historically, the courts have indicated that the tasks of enacting and en-
forcing immigration laws are federal functions. The federal agents who po-
lice the nation's borders have exceptionally broad policing authority-an
authority that the courts have justified based on the special need to secure
the nation's borders from a variety of threats. Part I of this essay will
summarize the Supreme Court jurisprudence that has endorsed exceptional-
ly broad policing powers not only at international borders, but also in a
much wider swath of immigration enforcement contexts. Over the past
decade, as a consequence of the expansion in the number of immigration
enforcement agents at the federal level and the rapidly increasing number
of sub-federal agents involved in immigration control efforts, immigration
enforcement has become a part of the everyday fabric of policing in the
United States. Therefore, after summarizing the broad powers granted to
police in the immigration enforcement context as a result of the Court's ju-
risprudence of border exceptionalism, Part II of this essay will consider the
implications of this jurisprudence in light of the recent trends that have
transformed the nature and scope of immigration policing. This Part con-
cludes that existing law is insufficient to protect against racial profiling and
unreasonable police arrests and detentions, and that the implications of
these recent developments extend well beyond the sphere of immigration
enforcement.
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INTRODUCTION
Immigration law and policy have entered a period of radical upheaval.
Different people have different perspectives as to what constitutes the "wa-
tershed" moment for immigration law in recent history, but scholars have
tended to focus on several key transformative events, including: (1) The
criminalization of hiring unauthorized workers, which was the product
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986;1 (2) The increasing militari-
zation of the U.S.-Mexico border region, which spiked in the early 1990s
and has continued through to the present;2 (3) The radical Congressional
overhaul of immigration law in 1996, which, among other things, led to a
vast increase in the grounds for the removal of lawful permanent residents
and the scope of mandatory administrative detention for noncitizens in re-
moval proceedings, while simultaneously stripping courts of jurisdiction to
hear many related legal claims; 3 (4) The reorganization and expansion of
the immigration enforcement bureaucracy following the terrorist attacks of
1. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2006).
For recent calls to eliminate these criminal sanctions, see Bill Ong Hing, NAFTA, Globaliza-
tion, and Mexican Migrants, 5 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 87, 126 (2009) (explaining the inefficacy
of employer sanctions); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized
Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193 (arguing for the repeal of
employer sanctions).
2. See PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE (2001);
see also Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 221-22, 243 (2003);
Wayne Cornelius, Evaluating Enhanced US Border Enforcement, MIGRATION INFORMATION
SOURCE (May 2004), http://www.migrationinfornation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=223.
3. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). For a detailed
discussion of these changes to the law, see Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Be-
tween Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81,
85 (2005). See also Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1891 (2000).
See generally Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws
and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000).
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September 11, 2001;4 (5) The rise in the use of criminal prosecutions in an
effort to "manage migration through crime;" 5 and (6) The rise of sub-
federal law enforcement participation in immigration enforcement.
6
But there are other factors that have contributed to the current policy
failures in the immigration sphere. These are not events, but rather critical
failures to enact changes in law and policy, including: (1) A failure to ex-
pand and improve the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) and
the Board of Immigration Appeals to deal with the growing administrative
caseload generated by the increase in removals and the expansion of immi-
gration detention;7 (2) A failure to enact comprehensive immigration
reform, or even piecemeal legislation, such as the Development, Relief and
Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act), to address the legal status
of (at least some of) the more than ten million unauthorized migrants living
and working in the United States; 8 (3) A failure to systematically address
4. For the reorganization, see the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 17-296,
116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). For a discussion of the
expansion of resources for border enforcement, see Jennifer M. Chac6n, A Diversion of At-
tention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights,
59 DuKE L.J. 1563, 1565-66 (2010).
5. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L.
REv. SIDEBAR 135 (2009), available at http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/
109/135_Chacon.pdf; see also Ingrid Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010) (discussing the effects of the merger of criminal and immigration en-
forcement systems on criminal processes).
6. See Chac6n, supra note 4, at 1579-97 (discussing the rise of state and local partici-
pation in immigration enforcement through formal collaboration with the federal govern-
ment and, increasingly, though informal "cooperation"); Karla Mari McKanders, The Con-
stitutionality of State and Local Laws Targeting Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REv. 579, 580-81 (2009) (noting the rise of, and arguing against the constitutionality of,
state and local ordinances enacted to regulate migration); Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws
in the Inherent Authority Position, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 965 (2004) (discussing and criti-
cizing the increasingly popular argument that state actors have the "inherent authority" to
enforce federal immigration law); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in
Federal Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REv. 567, 582-90 (2008) (noting the in-
crease in state and local regulation of immigration); Juliet Stumpf, States of Confusion: The
Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1557 (2008) (noting in-
creased sub-federal, immigration-related enactments passed under the rubric of the tradi-
tional police and welfare powers of states and localities); Rick Su, A Localist Reading of
Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1619, 1622-24 (2008) (noting the increase
in state and local regulation of immigration); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police
Enforcement ofImmigration Law, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1086-87 (2004).
7. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J.
1635, 1651-64 (2010) (detailing the "underresourcing" of the EOIR and the "procedural
shortcutting" of the BIA).
8. See Brandon E. Davis, America's Immigration Crisis: Examining the Necessity of
Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 54 Loy. L. REV. 353 (2008); Kevin R. Johnson, Pro-
tecting National Security Through More Liberal Admission of Immigrants, 2007 U. CHI. LE-
GAL F. 157, 173; Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild? College Residency and the Re-
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the United States' economic and social policies that have spurred emigra-
tion from Mexico; 9 (4) A failure to reexamine policies on racial profiling in
immigration enforcement even as the number of actors involved increases
and their overall expertise in immigration law decreases;' 0 and (5) A failure
to revise quotas for legal immigration and to revisit the allocation of non-
immigrant visas to take into account the realities of the modem economy."
The Fordham Urban Law Journal asked each of the contributors to de-
scribe a specific element of the U.S. Immigration system that needs to be
fixed, or a specific change to the system that needs to be made. The fore-
going list of policy decisions and policy failures-which is not nearly com-
plete-hints at how much needs to be done to create a rational, workable,
economically sensible, and humane immigration policy. Numerous scho-
lars and think-tanks have stepped into the fray, devising various compre-
hensive reform proposals aimed at achieving these goals. The notion of
settling on one "fix" for the immigration system is truly daunting in the
face of the many policy errors and failures that have brought us to the
present situation. Fortunately, there are many authors addressing many dif-
ferent facets of the problem in this publication. Therefore, this essay does
not purport, nor could it hope, to be a roadmap to comprehensive reform.
Instead, this essay will focus on the growing crisis in policing that is
emerging as a result of the above-mentioned policies and policy failures.
Historically, the courts have indicated that the tasks of enacting' 2 and en-
forcing13 immigration laws are federal functions. The federal agents who
sponse to Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REv. 99, 130 (2008); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Im-
migration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 91 (2007).
9. See Hing, supra note 1, at 93; Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration, Citizen-
ship, and U.S./Mexico Relations: The Tale of Two Treaties, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 121,
140 (1998); see also Gabriela A. Gallegos, Border Matters: Redefining the National Interest
in U.S.-Mexico Immigration and Trade Policy, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 1729 (2004).
10. See Chac6n, supra note 4, at 1615-19. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial
Profiling in America Became the 'Law of the Land': United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and
Whren v. United States and the Need for Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010).
11. Cristina M. Rodriguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive Con-
trol Over Immigration Policy, 59 DuKE L.J. 1787, 1796-803 (2010).
12. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889) ("That the
government of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can ex-
clude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy.
Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation.
It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent sub-
ject to the control of another power.").
13. See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (stating that the
powers to enforce and adjudicate immigration law can be delegated by Congress to the ex-
ecutive branch).
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police the nation's border 14 have exceptionally broad policing authority-
an authority that the courts have justified based on the special need to se-
cure the nation's borders from a variety of threats.15 Part I of this essay
summarizes the Supreme Court jurisprudence that has endorsed broad po-
licing powers, not only at international borders, but also in a much wider
swath of immigration enforcement contexts.
Over the past decade, as a consequence of the increase in the number of
immigration enforcement agents at the federal level and the rapidly ex-
panding number of sub-federal agents involved in immigration control ef-
forts, immigration enforcement has become a part of the everyday fabric of
policing in the United States. Therefore, after summarizing the broad pow-
ers granted to government officials engaged in immigration enforcement as
a result of the Court's jurisprudence of border exceptionalism, Part II of
this essay considers the implications of this jurisprudence in light of recent
trends that have transformed the nature and scope of immigration polic-
ing. 16 Part II concludes that existing law is insufficient to protect against
racial profiling and unreasonable police arrests and detentions. This has
law enforcement implications that extend well beyond the sphere immigra-
tion enforcement.
The systematic and significant changes in migration policing have been
largely ignored in the public policy debate over immigration. Plenty of
pundits and commentators have been willing to disparage Arizona's recent-
ly enacted, and even more recently partially enjoined,' 7 S.B. 107018 as a
law that effectively requires anyone who might look like an immigrant to
carry papers to avoid hassle and even criminal charges.19 What most of
these critics fail to acknowledge is that, with or without the Arizona law,
we have become a nation that routinely relies on policing practices that re-
quire certain populations to be ready to document their belonging. We
14. I use the term "border" metaphorically here to include all policing of migration. Of
course, as this essay makes clear, the scope of federal authority traditionally has varied in
accordance with the proximity of the federal agent to the physical border (or its functional
equivalent). See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part 1.
16. See infra Part II.
17. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (order on motion for
preliminary injunction).
18. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Sess., 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 113, as amended by H.B.
2162, 49th Leg., 2d Sess., 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 211.
19. See, e.g., The Rachel Maddow Show: Beheadings in Ariz?!?!? Gov. Brewer's
Cringeworthy Debate (MSNBC television broadcast Sept. 2, 2010) (referring to S.B. 1070
as a "papers, please" law); The Rachel Maddow Show: Racist Roots of Arizona Law
(MSNBC television broadcast Apr. 26, 2010), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
26315908//vp/36791568#36791568 (same).
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have not reached this point through the systematic development of laws and
policies that would ensure the fair and efficient administration and en-
forcement of the law. Instead, we have reached this state of affairs in an ad
hoc fashion that has bypassed broad public debate. In concluding, I offer
some thoughts on how to address the growing rights deficit attributable to
border exceptionalism.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S BORDER
EXCEPTIONALISM
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution places limits on the govern-
ment's power to search and seize, specifying that,
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.2°
These Fourth Amendment limitations on government investigations apply
to government officials operating everywhere within the boundaries of the
United States,21 including at the border.22 Subsection A explores how the
Supreme Court has applied the Fourth Amendment when evaluating
searches and seizures that occur at and near the international border. Sub-
section B focuses on how the Court's understanding of the government's
"strong" interest in controlling the border has migrated away from the bor-
der and into all aspects of immigration policing.
A. Searches At-And Near-The Border
While the Fourth Amendment governs interactions between government
officials and civilians at the border, as a practical matter, the constraints on
official actors at the border are less stringent than would be the case in
many other contexts. This is because the test for Fourth Amendment "rea-
sonableness" turns on the balance between the government's interest and
the individual's right to privacy. In the context of border policing, which
the courts have linked to the protection of sovereignty and the sanctity of
the nation's boundaries, 23 the courts have treated the government's interest
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. The extraterritorial application of these limitations is more contested. See e.g., Unit-
ed States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261-62 (1990) (declining to apply Fourth
Amendment protections to an extraterritorial search and seizure of a noncitizen). See gener-
ally Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2501 (2005).
22. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977).
23. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154-55 (1925).
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as extraordinarily strong.24 Thus, courts have a more permissive standard
for what constitutes a reasonable action on the part of a government actor
in the context of policing the international border than in many other polic-
ing contexts.
25
The Supreme Court has often treated the international border as a physi-
cal sphere in which the strong interests of the government in controlling the
flow of goods (particularly illegal drugs) and people into the country com-
pletely eclipse individual privacy interests. Several criminal procedure
cases decided between 1970 and 2005 illustrate the point.
In the case of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, the Supreme Court in-
validated a warrantless stop of an automobile by a roving border patrol
agent.26 The majority opinion, authored by Justice Stewart, rejected the
agency's argument that its authority to conduct searches was granted by
statute. The government had argued that the license to conduct routine,
roving automobile searches was granted to the agency by Congress through
the enactment of section 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.27 The statute provides for warrantless searches of automobiles and
other vehicles "within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of
the United States," as authorized by regulations to be promulgated by the
Attorney General. 28 The Attorney General's regulation defined (and con-
tinues to define) a "reasonable distance" as "within 100 air miles from any
external boundary of the United States." 29 The government thus argued
that the regulation allowed for random, warrantless searches of automobiles
within 100 miles of the border.
The Court declined to interpret the statute and regulation as allowing for
such an "extravagant license to search,"3 because it concluded that such
authority was inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. 3 1 Although the
point where the agent stopped Almeida-Sanchez' vehicle was only about
24. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1985)
(noting that Congress' "power to protect the Nation" justifies its grant to the Executive of
"plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border"); Ramsey, 431
U.S. at 616; United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1201 (3d Cir. 1984). The courts have
also deemed plenary Congress' power to legislate the exclusion of noncitizens from within
the nation's borders. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889).
25. See, e.g., United States v. 12,200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125
(1973).
26. 413 U.S. 266, 267 (1973).
27. Id. at 268.
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2006).
29. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (2010).
30. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 268.
31. Id. at 274.
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twenty-five miles from the border,32 the Court declined to treat this stretch
of road as the "functional equivalent" of the border, where virtually unli-
mited authority for searches exists.33 The "functional equivalent" of border
searches would include those taking place at "an established station near
the border, at a point marking the confluence of two or more roads extend-
ing from the border" or "a search of the passengers and cargo of an airplane
arriving at a St. Louis airport after a nonstop flight from Mexico City, 34
but not a search of a car on a road near the border by a roving patrol. 35
Thus, in cases involving roving patrols-even within twenty-five miles of
the border-the Court determined that stops could not be made where
agents "stop and search automobiles without a warrant, without probable
cause to believe the cars contain aliens, and even without probable cause to
believe the cars have made a border crossing." 36
While the decision created some limitations on the powers of border po-
lice, it also simultaneously reaffirmed the broad powers of executive agents
acting at the international border. The Court distinguished the roving
search at issue in Almeida-Sanchez from two other kinds of border
searches, those that take place at the border itself or its "functional equiva-
lent," and those that take place at permanent checkpoints "maintained at
certain nodal intersections." 37 In the latter two cases, border patrol agents
are entitled to conduct routine searches in the complete absence of the rea-
32. Id. at 268.
33. Id. at 273; see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) ("Travelers
may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self-protection
reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and
his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in."); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 623 (1886) (theorizing the existence of a "border search exception" to the Fourth
Amendment). For a repudiation of the argument in Boyd, see Martin Grayson, The Warrant
Clause in Historical Context, 14 AM. J. CRM. L. 107 (1987); Gregory L. Waples, Note,
From Bags to Body Cavities: The Law of Border Searches, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 53 (1974);
Harris J. Yale, Note, Beyond the Border of Reasonableness: Exports, Imports and the Bor-
der Search Exception, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 733, 745-52 (1983).
34. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273.
35. Justice Powell's concurrence took a more expansive view of the scope of permissi-
ble government intrusions near the border. While he agreed that warrantless, suspicionless
searches were impermissible, he argued that border patrol agents could carry out such
searches under the auspices of an "area warrant." Id. at 283-85 (Powell, J., concurring). For
a discussion of the broader significance of and problems created by the Powell concurrence,
see Note, Area Search Warrants in Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara, 84 YALE
L.J. 355, 367 (1974) ("Instead of helping to define where the border ends and where Fourth
Amendment rights attach, the Almeida-Sanchez concurrence will confuse the inquiry by
creating a quasi-border lying entirely within the bounds of the nation.").
36. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 268.
37. Id.
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sonable suspicion or probable cause that are generally required to conduct
stops and arrests.3
8
Almeida-Sanchez therefore be can be read as an affirmation of the
breadth of border search authority and a limitation on the geographic scope
of this border exceptionalism. 39 While the case law has permitted broad
searches absent probable cause (or even reasonable suspicion) to occur at
the border and its functional equivalent, Almeida-Sanchez clarified that the
"border" is a narrow zone-much narrower, indeed, than the 100 mile zone
carved out by statute and regulation for the search and arrest powers of
border agents.
Nevertheless, the protections offered by Almeida-Sanchez have proven
somewhat illusory, particularly when examined in the broader context of
the Supreme Court's border jurisprudence. First, the Court has given rov-
ing border agents broad latitude to conduct stops premised largely on the
basis of the target's race. This has been enshrined in American law since
1975, and has not been reexamined by the high Court despite significant
shifts in the demographics of the nation-shifts that severely undermine the
notion that individuals of "Mexican appearance" are likely to be present
without legal authorization.
40
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce4' involved a "roving border patrol" stop
near a fixed highway border checkpoint. The officers pulled over the de-
fendant's car, "saying later that their only reason for doing so was that its
three occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent. '42 As with other cases
38. Id. at 272-73; see also United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004)
(upholding the constitutionality of "routine" suspicionless border searches); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of routine, suspicion-
less searches at fixed immigration checkpoints).
39. These limits did not really exist prior to the decision. As Justice Powell notes in his
concurrence, this was the first time the Supreme Court addressed this question, but the cir-
cuit courts had determined that searches near the border should be treated the same way as
other border searches. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 268 (citing United States v. Miranda,
426 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1970), and Roa-Rodriguez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir.
1969)).
40. See, e.g., Rogelio Saenz, Latinos, Whites and the Shifting Demography of Arizona,
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (Sept. 2010), http://www.prb.org/Articles/2010/usarizona
latinos.aspx (noting that "the Latino population more than quadrupled from nearly 441,000
in 1980 to almost 2 million in 2008" and now constitutes almost thirty percent of the state's
population); see also United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (noting that that the "Hispanic population of this nation, and of the South-
west and Far West in particular, has grown enormously-at least five-fold in the four states
referred to in the Supreme Court's [Brignoni-Ponce] decision" and concluding that this de-
mographic shift, along with changing legal norms concerning racial profiling, invalidated
reliance on race as a factor in an immigration stop).
41. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
42. Id. at 875.
2010]
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involving immigration policing, the Court held that the government has a
"strong" interest in implementing effective measures to stop unauthorized
migration. 43 As evidence of the problem, the Court cited the high and
growing number of unauthorized migrants in the country.' The Court also
elaborated that unauthorized migrants "create significant economic and so-
cial problems, competing with citizens and legal resident aliens for jobs
and generating extra demand for social services. 45
In spite of the purportedly strong governmental interest involved, the
Court nevertheless declined to uphold searches of vehicles near the border
in the absence of reasonable suspicion.46 But it largely undercut the protec-
tive scope of this holding by concluding that "[t]he likelihood that any giv-
en person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican
appearance a relevant factor,"47 which, in connection with factors like
"proximity to the border, ' '48 can be enough to justify the stop.49 This con-
clusion does not provide much protection for the "[l]arge number of native-
born and naturalized citizens [that] have the physical characteristics identi-
fied with Mexican ancestry. '50 While one might be tempted to conclude
that Brignoni-Ponce-a 1975 case that preceded a vigorous national con-
versation on racial profiling5 i-is dead letter, even the present administra-
tion frequently and successfully cites it in litigating immigration enforce-
ment actions. 52 Department of Justice guidelines on racial profiling also
43. Id. at 881.
44. Id. at 878-79; see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538
(1985) (noting the "crisis" of migrants smugglers of narcotics at the border); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 551-52 (1976) (recognizing that the high number of illeg-
al immigrants from Mexico poses formidable law enforcement problems); cf United States
v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004) (relying instead on the simple reiteration of
the maxim that the government's interest in preventing unauthorized migration and entry of
illegal contraband is strong).
45. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878-79.
46. Id. at 882.
47. Id at 886-87.
48. Id. at 885.
49. Id. at 884-86.
50. Id. at 886.
51. See, e.g., Samuel L. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102
COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1413 (2002) (noting that the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
sparked a debate on the merits of racial profiling); Erik Luna, Foreword: The New Face of
Racial Profiling, 2004 UTAH L. REv. 905, 905-06 (discussing the political consensus in op-
position to racial profiling before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks).
52. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate
Bill 1070, GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 19 & nn.102-05), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=l 617440.
138 [Vol. XXXVIII
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sanction reliance on race in immigration enforcement.53 In short, race, with
very little else, can still form the basis for a valid roving border patrol
stop.
54
Moreover, having distinguished the border and its functional equivalent
from interior areas in cases like Brignoni-Ponce and Almeida-Sanchez, the
Court has given virtually free reign to agents at the border itself, effectively
creating a zone nearly devoid of any Fourth Amendment protections. Unit-
ed States v. Flores-Montano55 illustrates how far such searches can go.
There, border agents referred the defendant's car to a secondary inspection
station.56 This was a "routine" search not premised on any individualized
suspicion.57 Nevertheless, the defendant was required to wait twenty to
thirty minutes for a mechanic. When the mechanic finally arrived, "[h]e
raised the car on a hydraulic lift, loosened the straps and unscrewed the
bolts holding the gas tank to the undercarriage of the vehicle, and then dis-
connected some hoses and electrical connections."5 8 In a process that ulti-
mately took another fifteen to twenty-five minutes, the mechanic discov-
ered a significant load of marijuana under the gas tank.59 While it might
not be "unreasonable" to suggest that agents with "reasonable suspicion" of
a crime might engage in this sort of stop and search, it is important to stress
53. CIVIL RIGHTS Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE
By FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (June 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
crt/split/documents/guidance on race.htm. For a discussion of the guidelines, see Kevin R.
Johnson, Racial Profiling After September 11: The Department of Justice's 2003 Guide-
lines, 50 Loy. L. REv. 67 (2004).
54. Of course, law enforcement officers can circumvent even the very minimal protec-
tions provided by Brignoni-Ponce by pointing to other, legally acceptable factors justifying
the stop; the fact that race was the motivating factor for the stop will not invalidate an oth-
erwise lawful stop. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); see also Johnson, su-
pra note 10. But see United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.
2000) (concluding that reliance on race alone in making such stops did not give rise to rea-
sonable suspicion given the increasing percentage of individuals of Mexican ancestry law-
fully present in the country).
In United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that Hispanic appearance alone did not give rise to reasonable suspicion in an
immigration stop given the increasing percentage of individuals of Mexican ancestry lawful-
ly present in the country. But this ruling does not always prevent an officer's reliance on
race as the basis for immigration stops in the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Man-
zo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 935 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) ("In Montero-Camargo, we held that, in
regions heavily populated by Hispanics, an individual's apparent Hispanic ethnicity is not a
relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus. Such holding is inapplicable here be-
cause Havre, Montana is sparsely populated with Hispanics." (internal citation omitted)).
55. 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
56. Id. at 150.
57. Id. at 150-51.
58. Id. at 151.
59. Id.
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that this stop-which took between thirty-five and fifty-five minutes and
involved the partial disassembly of a vehicle-was approved unanimously
by the Supreme Court in the absence of any individualized suspicion what-
soever.60 In other words, anyone can "routinely" be asked to wait an hour
while their car is temporarily dismantled at the border, and agents need not
give any reason for authorizing this delay. The reasoning of Flores-
Montano subsequently has been used by lower courts to uphold even more
intrusive border searches in the complete absence of reasonable suspi-
cion-let alone probable cause-which is generally required to conduct
such searches. 6
1
As Flores-Montano and subsequent lower court cases have illustrated,
courts rarely find border stops-even when lengthy and intrusive-to be
nonroutine. 62 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez63 was one of the rare
exceptions, but rather than establishing upper limits on border searches, the
case provides further illustration of how little is required to vest border
agents with tremendous powers of search and seizure. In that case, Mon-
toya-Hemandez was referred to secondary inspection at Los Angeles Inter-
national Airport because her travel history raised questions in the mind of a
border agent.6 4 During secondary inspection, agents discovered that she
was carrying $5000 in cash, had no family or friends in the United States,
had packed very little clothing, and spoke little English.65 Based on these
facts, and that she had travelled from Bogota, Colombia (considered a
source destination for narcotics), inspecting agents developed suspicion
that she was a "balloon swallower" carrying narcotics in her alimentary
canal.66 On the basis of this suspicion-and in the absence of probable
cause-they detained Montoya-Hemandez for sixteen hours, told her she
60. Id. at 150.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008) (authorizing the
search of defendant's laptop computer, separate hard drive, computer memory stick, and six
compact disks at airport customs); see also United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir.
2005) (upholding ICE agents' review of a video in a video camera at the international bor-
der).
62. See Jon Adams, Rights at the United States Borders, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 353, 356 &
n. 17 (2005) (noting that "[c]ourts rarely find a sufficient level of intrusiveness to render a
general border search nonroutine").
63. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
64. See id. at 533.
65. Id. at 533-34. The Court does not suggest that the agent's suspicion at this point
rose to the level of reasonable suspicion. Indeed, the government appears to have argued
that such suspicion arose only after Montoya de Hernandez' discussion with Agent Tala-
mentes, which occurred after this referral. See id. at 534 ("At this point Talamentes and the
other inspector suspected that respondent was a 'balloon swallower' .... " (emphasis add-
ed)).
66. Id.
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could only go to the bathroom in a wastebasket, and when she refused to be
x-rayed on the grounds of pregnancy, transported her to the hospital for a
pregnancy test and rectal examination. 67 The Court concluded that such a
stop was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
68
B. Border Exceptionalism Migrates to the Interior
The reasoning of Flores-Montano, Montoya de Hernandez, and other
cases approving routine border searches is applicable at the border and its
functional equivalent, but because of the growing presence of fixed immi-
gration checkpoints, such border searches are increasingly common in the
interior of the country. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Court ap-
proved the routine stop of vehicles at fixed border checkpoints in the inte-
rior of the United States as well.6 9 In the consolidated cases at issue in
Martinez-Fuerte, one of the defendants, Martinez-Fuerte, had been referred
to "secondary" inspection after passing through the initial checkpoint.
70
The agents offered no basis for particularized suspicion as a justification
for the reference to secondary inspection or for the search that occurred
there, nor does the Court find that such referrals were made on a systemat-
ic, random basis. 71 The Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that, even
in the interior of the country, 72 a referral to an intrusive secondary immi-
gration search with no justification is consistent with the demands of the
Fourth Amendment. 73 Even if one accepts the notion that operating ran-
dom checkpoints under certain conditions may actually protect Fourth
Amendment values 74-one would want to see a justification for the use of
67. Id. at 535-36.
68. Id. at 541 ("We hold that the detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the scope
of a routine customs search and inspection, is justified at its inception if customs agents,
considering all the facts surrounding the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the
traveler is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal."). It might have been of some im-
portance to the majority that the defendant had been offered less intrusive means to end her
ordeal, although it is unclear how much weight the Court afforded that fact. See id. at 544.
69. 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976).
70. See id. at 547.
71. Id. at 547.
72. In Martinez-Fuerte, one checkpoint was located sixty-six miles from the Mexican
border on the "principal highway between San Diego and Los Angeles" and was conducted
with an official warrant, and one was located sixty-five to ninety miles from the nearest
point of the Mexican border in south Texas. Id. at 545, 547, 549-50.
73. Id. at 556-57.
74. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth
Amendment (Univ. of Chi. L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 530, 2010), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1665562 (arguing that randomized checkpoints, when properly im-
plemented, provide benefits of privacy protection and fairness in enforcement).
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random checkpoints and would also want to see some evidence of the me-
thods by which the "random" nature of the search was guaranteed.75
Indeed, in cases involving DUI and other non-immigration checkpoints
approved in the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, while random
checks are allowed for primary inspections, agents must justify referrals to
more intrusive, secondary inspections. 76 But the Court oddly declined to
require any such additional justification in the immigration checkpoint con-
text.77 The Court also failed to require the government to justify the
placement of these interior border checkpoints, which raises unanswered
constitutional questions about whether there are any limitations on the use
of such checkpoints in the interior.
One could justify the use of random, "suspicionless" border searches on
the ground that such searches have high "hit rates., 78 In Martinez-Fuerte,
the Court documented the fact that unauthorized noncitizens were found in
171 of the 820 vehicles referred to secondary inspection in San Clemente
during an eight day period in 1974. 79 Notably, however, the Court does not
actually rely on the twenty percent hit rate to justify its conclusions. In-
deed, troublingly, the Court conceded that in the consolidated case for the
Sarita checkpoint in Texas-where every car was stopped for question-
ing-the data needed to ascertain a hit rate was not available at all.8"
Nevertheless, relying again on San Clemente's twenty percent hit rate
from secondary inspections during an eight day period, and making no ef-
fort to ascertain whether these numbers are universal or exceptional at the
fixed border checkpoints to which the ruling would apply, the Court con-
cluded that "even if it be assumed that such referrals [to secondary inspec-
tion] are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, we perce-
ive no constitutional violation."'" Therefore, legal carte blanche is given
for racial profiling at fixed border checkpoints without any meaningful sta-
tistical justification for this outcome.
75. See Harcourt & Meares, supra note 74, at 38.
76. See, e.g., Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (approving DUI
checkpoints that include referrals to secondary inspection "[i]n cases where a checkpoint
officer detected signs of intoxication").
77. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 547 (noting that no basis for suspicion was pro-
vided for the referral to secondary inspection).
78. This general approach is endorsed by Harcourt and Meares, supra note 74, at 38, but
it is unlikely that those authors would condone the Court's methodology (or lack thereof) in
Martinez-Fuerte.
79. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
80. Id. One wonders whether that number would be closer to the less than .17% hit rate
based on vehicles flowing through primary inspection at San Clemente. See id
81. ld. at 563.
[Vol. XXXVIII
2010] BORDER EXCEPTIONALISM
Finally, in INS v. Delgado, the Court created another avenue for aggres-
sive immigration policing-the consensual encounter.8 2  Consensual en-
counters between law enforcement and civilians are common, and such en-
counters are not subject to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment. 83 Un-
Unfortunately, in recent years the Court has developed a notion of consent
that is, to put it mildly, somewhat detached from its lay meaning.8 4 Per-
haps unsurprisingly, some of the Court's most unrealistic notions of con-
sent have their roots in the Supreme Court's immigration enforcement juri-
sprudence-in particular, the Delgado case.
85
The Delgado case involved an Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) "survey" of a factory in California, in which armed agents entered
the workplace seeking to ascertain whether the workers possessed legal au-
thorization to work.86 Between twenty and thirty INS agents participated in
this workplace survey, blocking the exits to the building and moving
among the workers, questioning them about their status.88 "If the employee
gave an unsatisfactory response or admitted that he was an alien, the em-
82. 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (drawing the line be-
tween a consensual encounter and "stop" at the point where a reasonable person would be-
lieve she was not free to leave).
84. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the
Supreme Court, 39 McGEORGE L. REv. 27, 27 (2008) (noting a "surreal quality" to the Su-
preme Court's "consent" decisions); Ric Simmons, Not "Voluntary" but Still Reasonable: A
New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 774
(2005) (arguing that the consent requirement is "absurd, meaningless, and irrelevant"); Mar-
cy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 211 (2001) (posit-
ing that the Supreme Court's consent requirement "means very little"). For a discussion of
other such manipulations of the Fourth Amendment test, see Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails
and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz is Made of?, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 781 (2008).
85. See, e.g., Devon Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REv.
946, 991 (2002) (arguing that Delgado paved the way for the problematic holding in Florida
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), and later expansions of the consent doctrine).
86. 466 U.S. at 212. These "surveys" are now more typically characterized as
workplace raids. See, e.g., Cindy Carcamo, Fullerton Business Accused of Immigrant Ex-
ploitation, ORANGE CNTY. REGISTER, Sept. 1, 2010 (discussing the "ICE workplace en-
forcement raid" of a Fullerton company); Susan Carroll, Audits: ICE Isn't Cracking Down
on Illegal Immigrant Employees, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 31, 2010 (mentioning "the 2008 raid
of a Houston rag factory" and "a 2007 Ohio chicken factory raid").
87. Brief for Respondents at 10, INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (No. 82-1271);
Yvonne Abraham, As Immigration Raids Rise, Human Toll Decried, Bos. GLOBE, Mar. 20,
2007, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/03/20/asimmigration-raids rise
human toll decried; Julia Preston, Immigration Crackdown With Firings, Not Raids, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at Al ("The firings at the company, American Apparel, have become
a showcase for the Obama administration's effort to reduce illegal immigration by forcing
employers to dismiss unauthorized workers rather than by using workplace raids.").
88. 466 U.S. at 212-13. The majority stresses that the guns were never drawn and that
"employees were free to walk around within the factory." Id.
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ployee was asked to produce his immigration papers." 89 The four respon-
dents in Delgado, who had been working in the factory on the day of the
incident, argued that the conduct of the INS officers violated their Fourth
Amendment right because the officers seized them in the absence of rea-
sonable suspicion. 90
The Supreme Court disagreed. In an opinion authored by Justice Rehn-
quist, the Court concluded that these interactions were "consensual" inte-
ractions not governed by the Fourth Amendment. 9' According to Justice
Rehnquist, "[o]rdinarily, when people are at work their freedom to move
about has been meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law enforce-
ment officials, but by the workers' voluntary obligations to their employ-
ers." 92 In this framework, if workers did not feel free to leave, it was be-
cause of their workplace obligations, and not because of the armed
immigration agents surrounding and infiltrating the building.93 As Justice
Powell points out in his concurrence, the Court could have upheld the sei-
zures in this case by concluding that there was indeed a stop, but that the
government's strong interest justified the intrusion.94 Instead, the Court
rested its holding on a notion of "consent" that defies common sense and
prior legal understandings of the term.95 This expansive notion of "con-
sent" has affected immigration policing both at the border and away from
it.
II. THE EXPANSION OF BORDER EXCEPTIONALISM (AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT)
Taken together, the border cases described in Part I mean an agent needs
no suspicion to conduct a fairly intrusive search at the border or its func-
tional equivalent. Such searches are constitutional if they rest on no rea-
89. Id.
90. Id. at 213.
91. Id. at 221.
92. Id. at 218.
93. See Carbado, supra note 85 (arguing that the Court concluded that it was "their
workplace responsibilities, and not the INS, [that] restricted their freedom of movement").
Carbado criticizes this problematic analysis, also evident in Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Bostick, as ignoring the relevant social context of the policing involved and evincing a wil-
lingness to allow people of certain races-in this case Latinas/os-to bear the burden of jus-
tifying their belonging. Id. at 991, 998.
94. 466 U.S. at 221-24 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Carbado, supra note 85, at 997-
98.
95. See, e.g., 466 U.S. at 225-26 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("I am convinced that a fair application of our prior decisions to the facts of this case com-
pels the conclusion that respondents were unreasonably seized by INS agents in the course
of these factory surveys.").
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sonable suspicion or probable cause, even when they entail a "stop" of over
an hour while one's car is temporarily dismantled. Not only are Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) officers entitled to search the luggage of en-
tering passengers regardless of whether there is any suspicion of wrong-
doing, but recent cases have suggested that they are entitled to review the
entire content of laptop computers of entering passengers.96 Indeed, organ-
izations that advocate for civil liberties have filed lawsuits seeking infor-
mation about the CBP practice of copying and retaining large amounts of
data stored on travelers' laptops.
9 7
For other highly intrusive stops and searches, such as those involving
both physical searches of the alimentary canal and detentions in excess of
sixteen hours, the Court appears to require reasonable suspicion, but cer-
tainly has not required probable cause of criminal activity for these extreme
measures. Nor is it clear that individuals can walk away to avoid these
sorts of intrusions at the border.98 In short, very few meaningful Fourth
Amendment protections remain at the border and its functional equiva-
lent.99
The Court has also given the green light to stops at fixed border check-
points that are more intrusive than the stops allowed at other checkpoints
authorized under the Fourth Amendment.' 00 This means that the sweeping
powers of the government at the border extend, in modified fashion, far in-
to the interior of the country.
Although Almeida-Sanchez purports to create additional protections
against "roving" stops near, but not at, the international border, the nature
of these protections is limited in two significant ways. First, Supreme
Court jurisprudence still allows the use of race as a legitimate factor in ge-
nerating the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct stops of individuals
96. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing border
search cases involving laptops and videos); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir.
2005) (same).
97. Asian Law Caucus v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. C08-00842 CW, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 98344, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2008).
98. See, e.g., Torbet v. United Airlines, 298 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2002). For a discussion
of this and related cases, see Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Search and Seizure in a Post-
9/11 World, INT'L SOC'Y FOR THE REFORM OF CRIM. L. (2008), http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/
2007/Loewy.pdf.
99. Some circuit courts also have adopted an extended border search doctrine, under
which border searches that occur near the border are deemed constitutionally permissible if
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940,
949 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Ogbuehi, 18 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir. 1994) (treating
secondary inspection as a routine border search although it occurred a few minutes after de-
fendant had crossed the border and sixty feet away). Although these expansions of the bor-
der search doctrine are quite modest, they demonstrate the malleability of the concept.
100. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
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(and vehicles) not only at the border and its functional equivalent, but eve-
rywhere. Although race cannot be the "only" factor used to justify the stop,
the use of this factor along with another-like type of dress or car-is per-
missible, which means stops based solely on race and class are counte-
nanced by the law of the land.1" 1 When viewed in connection with the
Court's unwillingness to examine seemingly reasonable stops for imper-
missible racial motives, 10 2 this rule allows for virtually unbridled racial
profiling, not only in roving border inspections, but in immigration en-
forcement more generally.
Second, interactions in which individuals are cowed into complying with
official requests for information are quite likely to be deemed "consensual"
interactions by courts, thus eliminating the need for reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. The fictitious "consent" of the workers in Delgado creates
an extremely low bar for government agents wishing to claim that their
searches of homes and workplaces were consensual. The argument has be-
come extremely common and successful in the context of workplace and
home raids by ICE. 1"3 Consent is also used by the Border Patrol to justify
101. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 1038.
102. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
103. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 542 F.3d 704, 710-11 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding
that consent to entry was established although the only evidence came from ICE agents'
conflicting and inconsistent testimony); see also CARDOZO IMMIGR. JUST. CLINIC, CONSTI-
TUTION ON ICE: A REPORT ON IMMIGRATION HOME RAID OPERATIONS 6-10, available at
http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/Cardozo/Profiles/immigrationlaw-741/IJCICE-
Home-Raid-Report%20Updated.pdf (noting that because ICE conducted most home raids
without judicial warrant, consent was required, but also noting a significant percentage of
home raids in New Jersey and Long Island, New York where consent was not obtained);
Marisa Antos-Fallon, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Immigration Enforcement in
the Home: Can ICE Target the Utmost Sphere of Privacy?, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 999,
1006 (2008) (citing several complaints alleging ICE entry without warrants or meaningful
consent).
The Obama administration has expressed an intention to reduce reliance on high-
profile workplace raids, focusing efforts instead on noncitizens who have criminal records
or pose other threats to the community. See Julia Preston, U.S. Identifies 111,000 Immi-
grants With Criminal Records, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 12, 2010, at A13 ("At a news conference
in Washington, John Morton, the top official at Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
called the program 'the future of immigration enforcement,' because, he said, it 'focuses our
resources on identifying and removing the most serious criminal offenders first and fore-
most.' . . . Obama administration officials have worked to distinguish their immigration en-
forcement strategy from the Bush administration's, which centered on high-profile factory
raids and searches in communities for immigration fugitives."). Interestingly, these and oth-
er reform efforts have sparked resistance from career staff-the "agency middle managers
and attorneys, and the union that represents immigration officers." Andrew Becker, Ten-
sions Over Obama Policies Within Immigration and Customs Enforcement, WASH. POST,
Aug. 27, 2010, at B3. The strong push-back is perhaps unsurprising in light of the fact that
so many agents were hired so quickly into an extremely permissive enforcement milieu.
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boarding domestic trains and asking passengers for identification. 10 4 The
fictitious nature of the "consent" in many of these cases is clear,10 5 but
equally clear from the case law is the Court's willingness to accept the fic-
tion.
Given these two significant limitations on Fourth Amendment protec-
tions, jurisprudential checks on improper police conduct in the context of
immigration policing are minimal. These problems are compounded fur-
ther by the fact that there is seldom a remedy for Fourth Amendment viola-
tions in cases that are referred to immigration courts rather than criminal
courts because the exclusionary rule is generally inapplicable in removal
proceedings, except in cases involving "egregious violations."' 1 6 Ultimate-
ly, agents enforcing immigration laws can engage in racial profiling and
conduct coercive searches without reasonable suspicion or probable cause
under the auspices of legal "consent," and, in instances when their conduct
is so improper that it nevertheless runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment, can
likely rely on the fruits of their unlawful investigations in any ensuing im-
migration proceedings. And although some lower courts and immigration
judges have occasionally intervened to suppress evidence in the face of
egregious ICE illegality, 10 7 the Supreme Court has largely written itself out
of any supervisory role in immigration enforcement, and has provided no
guidance to lower courts as to when such interventions might be appropri-
ate. As the number of agents engaged in immigration enforcement has
grown exponentially, so has the problem of inadequate supervision over
immigration policing.
104. See Nina Bernstein, Border Sweeps in North Reach Miles Into U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2010, at Al; see also Sasha Abramsky, Terror on the Inner Border, NATION, Sept.
26, 2005, http://www.thenation.com/article/terror-inner-border (discussing CBP practice of
boarding domestic Amtrak trains to ask for identification in Havre, Montana).
105. See Nina Bernstein, When the Border Patrol Comes Aboard, CITY RooM, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2010, 10:04 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/when-
the-border-patrol-comes-aboard/?scp=2&sq-trains%20immigration%20police&st-cse ("It's
just like they're authority figures, so you answer.").
106. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); see also Chac6n, supra note 4, at
1611-15; Stella Burch Elias, Good Reason to Believe: Widespread Constitutional Violations
in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza,
2008 WIs. L. REv. 1109, 1115.
107. See, e.g., Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2008)
(upholding immigration judge's finding that entry was nonconsensual and ruling that "the
government may not show consent to enter from the defendant's failure to object to the en-
try") (internal citations omitted); United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d 350, 357-58
(5th Cir. 2007) (finding that consent was not voluntary where it was obtained after ICE
agents conducted an initial unconstitutional raid and search of the defendant's home); In re
Perez Cruz, No. A 95-748-837 (L.A. Immigr. Ct. Feb. 10, 2009) (suppression order) (sup-
pressing evidence illegally seized in workplace raid and granting Respondent's motion to
terminate removal proceedings).
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A. Increasing Immigration Enforcement and the Spread of Border
Exceptionalism
The expansion of immigration policing over the past decade has taken
two different forms. First, the number of federal agents and dollars de-
voted to immigration control has skyrocketed. This is true both in the inte-
rior and at the border.' On the federal level, the vast expansion in the
number of agents dedicated to enforcement has resulted in an expansion of
the kinds of policing practices evidenced in the border search cases out-
lined in Part I.
But a second, and perhaps more important, trend is that state and local
law enforcement agents have become important players in immigration en-
forcement. 09 Sub-federal actors such as state and local police officers are
now actively engaged in various forms of immigration policing. Some of
these efforts involve cooperation and coordination with federal immigra-
tion agents, but other efforts are proceeding independently.
On the cooperative end of the spectrum are states and localities that have
signed memoranda of agreement with the federal government that allow
them to participate in immigration enforcement, subject to training and
oversight by federal officials. These agreements, known as 287(g) agree-
ments, 10 can authorize state or local officials to engage in enforcement ef-
forts identical to those undertaken by federal immigration enforcement
agents.'' This translates to a significant expansion in the number of agents
nationwide who are able to take advantage of the broad statutory and con-
stitutional authority granted to officials engaged in immigration enforce-
ment. Available data suggests that in at least some locations where local
officials have authority to enforce immigration law pursuant to 287(g)
agreements, law enforcement agents have changed their policing practices
108. See Andreas, supra note 2; Cornelius, supra note 2. President Obama underscored
the point in a July 2010 speech about immigration reform, noting:
Today, we have more boots on the ground near the Southwest border than at any
time in our history. Let me repeat that: We have more boots on the ground on the
Southwest border than at any time in our history. We doubled the personnel as-
signed to Border Enforcement Security Task Forces. We tripled the number of in-
telligence analysts along the border.
President Barack Obama, Remarks on Comprehensive Immigration Reform at American
University School of International Service (July 1, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-comprehensive-
immigration-reform.
109. See Chac6n, supra note 4, at 1579.
110. 287(g) is the section of the Immigration and Nationality Act that provides statutory
authority for these agreements. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
111. Id.
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in ways that increasingly target Latina/o residents." 2 Critics argue that the
rise in racial profiling in areas that have adopted 287(g) agreements signals
the need for the elimination of the program. 1
3
Far from moving to eliminate the program, however, the federal gov-
ernment has signaled its intent to preserve it.114 More significantly, the
government is effectively nationalizing aspects of the program through the
national roll-out of the Secure Communities Initiative (S-Comm). 115 In ju-
risdictions where that program is in place, arrestees are screened through
the FBI and DHS databases, which contain information on both criminal
and civil immigration violations. Such screening occurs without regard for
the reason for the arrest or whether the person is guilty or innocent of a
crime. "6  It is essentially impossible for localities to opt out of the S-
Comm program. 1 7 To the extent that 287(g) and other collaborative pro-
grams have spiked stops and arrests of Latinas/os, it seems likely that S-
Comm will have the same effect. Although S-Comm theoretically should
have no impact on policing since it involves post-arrest screenings, like the
287(g) program, S-Comm heightens the incentives (and reduces the costs)
of making stops where a state or local official believes the stop might re-
veal an immigration violator. The problem is aggravated by the fact that
state and local agents receive little to no formal training in immigration en-
112. See, e.g., New Study Finds Dramatic Problems with 287(g) Immigration Program,
AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION N.C. (Feb. 18, 2009), http://acluofnc.org/?q=new-study-finds-
dramatic-problems-287g-immigration-program.
113. Id.
114. Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Announces New
Agreement for State and Local Immigration Enforcement Partnerships & Adds 11 New
Agreements (July 10, 2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr 124724645
3625.shtm
115. Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Unveils Sweeping
New Plan to Target Criminal Aliens in Jails Nationwide (Mar. 28, 2008), available at http://
www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/080414washington.htm.
116. More Questions Than Answers About the Secure Communities Program, NAT'L IM-
MIGR. L. CTR. (NILC, Washington D.C.), Mar. 2009, at 1-2, available at http:/ www.nilc.
org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/secure-communities-2009-03-23.pdf.
117. Shankar Vedantam, No Opt-Out for Immigration Enforcement, WASH. POST, Oct. 1,
2010, at B5 ("The Obama administration is making it virtually impossible for Arlington
County, the District and other jurisdictions to refuse to participate in a controversial immi-
gration enforcement program that uses fingerprints gathered by local enforcement agencies
to identify illegal immigrants."); see also Tracy Seipel, Santa Clara County Supervisors
Vote to Opt Out of Secure Communities Program, MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 28, 2010), http://
www.mercurynews.com/ci_16199369?IADID=Search-www.mercurynews.com-www.
mercurynews.com (reporting that Santa Clara County supervisors unanimously voted to
pursue opting out of S-Comm, but that state and federal officials had to be notified in writ-
ing, and state officials had previously denied San Francisco's effort to opt out).
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forcement.i 8 Since the program is scheduled to be in effect nationally by
2013,119 it would seem to be an opportune time for Congress or the Execu-
tive Branch to provide for some additional restrictions on the use of race in
immigration enforcement. No such reevaluation appears to be underway,
however.
The problem is further magnified by the fact that many state and local
authorities are acting on their own initiative to enforce federal immigration
law. The notion that states have the "inherent authority" to enforce federal
immigration laws is a relatively new and legally controversial one. Prior to
2002, the federal government had taken the position that sub-federal actors
were not authorized to enforce federal immigration laws independently, al-
though they could conduct arrests in cases involving violations of federal
criminal law.12 0 In 2002, when announcing the launch of the National Se-
curity Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) program, John Ashcroft
noted that states would have the power to enforce federal immigration laws
in support of the federal government's antiterrorism mission.1 21
This announcement, which "seemed like an afterthought"'122 actually
upended decades of settled law and policy.' 23 Over the past decade states
and localities, prompted in no small part by the apparent powers granted to
them by this policy reversal, have begun their own efforts to police immi-
gration. In the absence of 287(g) agreements, some sub-federal law en-
forcement agents are enforcing immigration laws pursuant to their pur-
ported "inherent authority" to enforce federal immigration laws. 124
118. Even under the 287(g) program, where training was a formal part of the statutorily-
authorized cooperation, government reports concluded that oversight and training was woe-
fully insufficient. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILrrY OFFICE, GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT: BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL
ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d09109.pdf. S-Comm participation requires no training in immigration enforcement.
119. Indeed, ICE recently announced that the program is now in place in every county in
Texas, and the program is now operating in 659 jurisdictions in 32 states. Press Release,
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, All Texas Counties Now Participating in Secure
Communities Program (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/1009/100929
dallas.htm.
120. Pham, supra note 6, at 977 (noting that this position was "taken by the Ninth Circuit
and, until recently, the Department of Justice); see also Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d
468, 476 (9th Cir. 1983).
121. Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks at the National Security Entry-Exit
Registration Program (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/
speeches/2002/060502agpreparedremarks.htm.
122. Pham, supra note 6, at 965-66.
123. Id.
124. The most important contemporary architect of the "inherent authority" argument is
Kris Kobach, who was working in the Justice Department at the time Attorney General
Ashcroft announced the policy shift, and who subsequently expanded on the argument in a
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Moreover, state and local participation in immigration has taken the
form of states and localities creating and enforcing independent, state-level
restrictions on migration. Arizona's S.B. 1070 may be the best-known ex-
ample, but it is not the only one. 125  These sub-federal criminal ordin-
ances-which are more than likely unconstitutional efforts on the part of
sub-federal actors to engage in federal criminal law enforcement 12 6-have
the effect of enshrining existing federal authorization for racial profiling in
immigration enforcement into state law.' 27  More generally, this trend
means that the permissive approach to policing endorsed in the Court's
border jurisprudence is increasingly becoming a policing norm in some
parts of the country. Unchecked, that trend is likely to continue.
Some supporters of more restrictive immigration policies argue that they
are happy to be stopped and asked for identification. 128 These views reflect
a rational policy preference. The problem is that it is not a policy prefe-
rence that reflects existing policy choices. Up to now, it has been impossi-
ble to create a national identity card; the closest thing the United States has
are the requirements of the REAL ID Act, out of which a number of states
full-length law review article. See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier:
The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179
(2005). Sheriff Arpaio has relied on such authority to continue to police immigration of-
fenses even after the cancellation of his 287(g) agreement. Miriam Jordan, Arizona Sheriff,
U.S. in Standoff Over Immigration Enforcement, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2010, http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703455804575057650062572536.html (quoting Sheriff
Arpaio arguing "[w]e have the inherent right to enforce federal immigration law," and "[i]f
Washington doesn't like it, I recommend they change the laws"). For a refutation of Ko-
bach's "inherent authority" argument, as embraced by Sheriff Arpaio and others, see Pham,
supra note 6, at 965-68.
125. An ordinance enacted in Hazleton, Pennsylvania would have required an employer
who hired unauthorized workers to fire those workers within three business days after re-
ceiving notice from the city or risk suspension of its business license. Hazleton, Pa., Ordin-
ances 2006-18 (Sept. 18, 2006).
126. See generally Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, Cracked Mirror: SB1070 and Other
State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law (Ariz. L. Studies, Discussion Paper
No. 10-25, 2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractid=1648685.
127. S.B. 1070, for example, allows racial profiling to the extent it is permitted by federal
and state law. Clearly, federal law allows for fairly broad reliance on racial profiling in im-
migration enforcement. See supra notes 41-53 (discussing the Brignoni-Ponce case); see
also Chin et al., supra note 52, at 16-20 (concluding that the law codifies well-established
reliance on racial profiling in immigration enforcement).
128. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 104 ("'It [being asked for identification on Amtrak
by CBP officials] makes me feel safe,' volunteered Katie Miller, 34, who was riding Amtrak
to New York from Ohio. 'I don't mind being monitored."'). The European model, where
requests for identification are common and where individuals are expected to carry identifi-
cation at all times, is often cited as a potential model, although European nations also have
more exacting privacy laws to protect personal data. See, e.g., Why Not a National ID?,
Bos. GLOBE, Jan. 20, 2008, at K8, available at http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial
_opinion/editorials/articles/2008/01/20/why not a national id/.
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have now opted. 129 The failure of the national legislature to enact a policy
that requires all those lawfully present to carry a certain identifying docu-
ment reflects a lack of consensus on the question of whether we should en-
gage in widespread internal policing of identification and belonging.
But policing practices have evolved as if this consensus already exists-
that is, as if citizens (and others lawfully present) are already aware that
they are required to carry identification to prove their belonging and are
aware of the consequences for failing to do so. These policing practices
create de facto requirements that some populations-particularly those sus-
pected of being "foreign"--be prepared to document their belonging. 3 °
This requirement exists without formal codification and thrives because the
jurisprudence of border policing is very forgiving. Additionally, because it
is not part of an overarching policy choice, its implementation is uneven
and discriminatory.
B. What is to be Done About Border Exceptionalism?
In light of the changing landscape of immigration enforcement, it is time
for legislatures and agencies to impose more meaningful restrictions on all
forms of immigration policing, notwithstanding the permissive Fourth
Amendment framework set in place by earlier Supreme Court cases. First,
standards for inspection at the border and its functional equivalent should
be tightened. ICE and CBP officials should be required to have "reasona-
ble suspicion" of a violation prior to referring individuals to more intrusive
secondary inspections. Highly intrusive searches, such as laptop searches
and full body searches, should be prohibited in the absence of probable
cause.
Second, ICE and CBP should cease to rely on "consent" as the basis for
making home entries and for checking identification on mass transit far
from the border. These searches may be "consensual" as defined in the
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but in fact they rely on coercive uses of
129. See, e.g., National ID and the REAL ID Act, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
http://epic.org/privacy/id-cards/#state (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (noting legislation in nine-
teen states opting out of the REAL ID Act).
130. Huyen Pham, When Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REv. 1115, 1160 (2009)
("[T]hose who have a foreign accent or appearance or who were born in another country can
expect to be asked to show documents when others are not, be asked to show more docu-
ments, or be denied restricted benefits altogether. And because there are so many moving
border laws, enacted by all levels of government, we can expect that large numbers of
people with legal status will experience this discrimination. Those singled out for this dis-
crimination will feel the impact through everyday transactions, as they apply for jobs, hous-
ing, and other essential benefits. For them, moving border laws will become permanent
borders of discrimination.").
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power. Home entries would still be permissible with a warrant. Stops on
trains would still be permissible in cases where officers had reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to conduct such a stop. But searches in the ab-
sence of any articulable reason would be prohibited, and agents could not
rely on fictional consent to justify unwarranted searches.
Third, the Department of Justice guidelines on racial profiling should be
revised to bring the standards for immigration policing in line with those
articulated for general law enforcement purposes. At this point, immigra-
tion policing is so inextricably intertwined with general law enforcement
that allowing profiling in the immigration context effectively guarantees
reliance on profiling in all law enforcement efforts. Once the federal gov-
emiment has articulated higher standards, state and local agents deputized
through 2 87(g) will also be held to those higher standards, and this could
help slow the rising tide of racial profiling that has been generated by in-
creased state and local participation in immigration policing.
Fourth, remedies for Fourth Amendment violations in the context of
immigration enforcement need to be strengthened. Pursuant to the Court's
1984 decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,' the exclusion remedy is rarely
available in civil removal proceedings-which is where many immigration
enforcement actions lead. The Court's open hostility to the exclusionary
rule makes a reversal of Lopez-Mendoza unlikely, but legislative imposi-
tion of exclusion in removal proceedings could achieve the same end.
132
Ideally, however, legislative change would address not only the need to ex-
tend the exclusionary rule to removal proceedings, but also would remove
bars to the kind of class action civil suits by noncitizens that might help to
deter Fourth Amendment violations by immigration agents. 1
33
Ultimately, all of these changes to the law might be politically difficult
to achieve. But any one of them would help to slow the erosion of Fourth
Amendment protections in policing that began at the border, and have
slowly extended throughout the interior of the country, affecting citizens
and noncitizens alike.
131. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
132. Chac6n, supra note 4, at 1624-27.
133. Id. at 1628-30.
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